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The Poetics Of Death: Intimations And Illusions 
 
Lawrence Kimmel 
 
 
“…at bottom, no one believes in his own death—or 
to put the same thing in another way, in the 
unconscious everyone of us is convinced of his own 
immortality.” 
--Sigmund Freud, 
“Thoughts on War and Death” 
 
I 
 
   From whom shall we learn about death—that is, death 
itself, the intimacy of our own death?  From biologists, 
priests, physicians, psychologists, philosophers, poets?  Or 
from the aged, the dying, the terminally ill?  And in relation 
to what?  Self, others; body, mind, soul, world?  And with 
respect to what?  Acceptance, denial, reassurance?  Surely all 
the above—understanding the enigma of death at any depth 
requires whatever assistance we can get.  It is equally 
important to acknowledge, however, that the context and 
occasion of our asking is not incidental to what we can 
finally learn.  In the most general way it is arguably from the 
acute insights and particularized expressions of poets that we 
best come to understand the name and nature of death.  The 
poetic focus of consciousness is on the thing itself—on the 
consciousness of what a thing means. But first it must 
become a thing; which is to say that the nature of what is 
unknown becomes embodied in its naming, and the field of 
its meaning is discovered therein.  But it is only the field of 
its meaning that is available in the case of death: the most we 
can hope for is some hermeneutic understanding of the 
mystery in which it remains embedded.  
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   In speaking of the poetics of death I have in mind a process 
of philosophy which incorporates the perception of the poet.  
Poiesis, “to make”, is at the heart of this endeavor of 
imagination; following Heidegger’s analysis, poiesis is a 
making space in which meaning emerges and through which 
truth (aletheia) comes to presence.  The dialectical result of 
this philosophical poetics is a focused inquiry in which one 
comes to understand in an acute form what it is he already 
knows (Plato on method, Heidegger on death) and through 
this existential dialectic, becomes who he is (Kierkegaard on 
existence.) 
 
   In the poetics of the old testament, one of the many points 
of understanding the story of Eden is that the soul of Man 
can have no garden without a snake—a  presence which is 
hidden, dangerous, seductive, secret, evil…  Recall that the 
choice in Eden was mortality—i.e. to become a human-
being.  Man becomes a conscious creature in time and death 
becomes the definitive limit of his existence.  Embodied in 
this myth is a primal recognition that alive we are strangers 
unto ourselves; that whatever meaning there is to our own 
existence ultimately is beyond us—that death is the final and 
finally irresolvable riddle of life well beyond the promised 
knowledge of good and evil. This is not quite so in practical 
terms of course: one may resolve the riddle of death by 
dissolving the mystery—the strategy of the Stoics.  Or, one 
may introduce a Master Riddle Solver as an addendum to the 
Stoic idea that death is nothing, in which death becomes 
rather a transitory abstraction between mortality and 
immortality.  But the Deus ex Machina only postpones the 
problem of a solution so far as consciousness is concerned.  
One may be convinced and so become habituated to the idea 
of immortal life—a denial of death and/or a belief in ‘a 
resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come’ 
and this pragmatic override of consciousness may indeed 
bring comfort in the face of the unknowable, but the riddle of 
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death continues to gnaw at the edges of our most quiet 
moments. 
 
   At the very least an adequate understanding of our own 
death requires that we remain acutely aware of the mystery 
of life, and so requires the focus of the poet whose particular 
genius is to touch the face of the mysterious and leave it 
unchanged. Why poets?  Poetry is engaged in the making of 
meaning, and in the case at hand, the making of space within 
which the meaning of death becomes intimate, becomes real, 
becomes…mine.  We do not want death explained; we want 
rather to understand the mystery of its meaning.  Wisdom is 
not in finding an explanation which will satisfy another, but 
of discovering and unfolding a word, a name, a meaning 
which finds resonance with one’s own life. 
 
   The power of words:  what is in a name—“love, death, 
truth, beauty, justice..?” Words as such and in a primal sense 
are occasions that open up understanding to the mystery of 
existence. Some words more than others, obviously: so the 
challenge of poetic discourse is to probe the intimate and 
shared mystery of life and death through a primal naming 
that seeks to arrest for a kairic moment the current of 
existence. Words constitute a distance from the ongoing flux 
that otherwise carries captive each living moment into 
oblivion and this distance allows a doubling of existence in 
which we are enabled to understand that we exist, that we are 
live, and that we will die.  It is the space of consciousness 
within this doubling that the paradox of existence grows into 
mystery, and it is that within and for which poetry strives for 
expression.  There are no experts on death, however, any 
more than on life, or truth, or beauty.  The poet’s voice is 
always that of an amateur, whose hands are empty of an 
instrument of surety. It is a voice which at its best provides a 
wisdom of intimacy which she brings to the common and 
deeper concerns of existence. 
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II 
 
   Aside from the figurative humor about Death and Taxes, 
only the literal certainty of death remains: the one certainty 
in life is death—not love, not truth, not justice, not 
redemption…   So in one sense we are as certain of our death 
as we are of our life.  They are two sides of the same coin of 
existence.  Life and death are limiting concepts of individual 
existence; life can be short or long while death can only be 
final but together they are easy or difficult, pleasurable or 
painful and for the individual both are absolute.   Life and 
death as different and definitive aspects of existential 
certainty are a common pairing in philosophy as well as 
poetry.  Whatever Descartes’ prior and ensuing doubts about 
things generally, the Cogito captures the immediacy and 
certainty of individual existence.  Consciousness and life are 
thus jointly immanent, but this is realized only upon 
reflection and this reflection brings with it the parallel 
certainty of death.   “What is life?” is no simpler question 
than “What is death?” and the deep sense of connection 
between these two poles of existential certainty constitutes 
the imaginative ground of poetic insight. 
 
   For the individual, consciousness is life, but this same 
consciousness is an awareness however repressed or remote 
of death.  Freud’s analysis of consciousness argues that it has 
no clear acknowledgement of an ending; however this is not 
to say that we are unaware that our existence is being toward 
death (Heidegger.)  Being in death, just as being-in-life are 
two ways of expressing the same existence in time.  Freud’s 
analysis of death is unusual in that the contrast in his account 
of the dynamics of consciousness is not a confluence of life 
and death, but of love and death: Eros and Thanatos.  
Freud’s (late) idea in developing this pair of primal instincts 
is that they seem to hold operational dominion in terms of 
emotional life and development as elemental drives of the 
organism itself:  “Organism” is already greatly transformed 
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in the case of homo-sapiens, however, so that its range 
includes not only physiological but psychological—moral 
and spiritual—dimensions.  Love and death as elemental 
instincts are functional in human consciousness at the point 
of first awareness.  That is, with the birth of consciousness in 
Man come the combinatory features of the paradox 
life/death.  It may be important to acknowledge that ‘lower’ 
forms of animate life possess similar capacities—in the 
higher primates there is evidence of grieving, for example a 
gorilla may pine away at the death of a mate or offspring. 
Whether or not it can be aware of the accompanying 
paradox, the rising creature arguably has an intimation of the 
intimate connection between its own life and death. 
 
   The insistence in literature that only man dies remains an 
elemental focus of the poetic, as in Yeats’ familiar lines from 
his poem “Death”: 
Nor dread nor hope attend/ A dying animal; 
A man awaits his end/ Dreading and hoping all… 
He knows death to the bone/ Man has created death. 
   The attribution to human beings of the singular capacity of 
knowing that she is going to die becomes the touchstone of 
the poetic celebration of life. That this awareness of life in 
human beings is at the same time and always the awareness 
of not-life, death,  gives life a fullness and depth it would 
otherwise lack.  There is an irony in this awareness of death 
as the end of existence and also the end of consciousness: 
death as a presence in consciousness is the most secret and 
intimate fact of psychic life, but as an event will in the end 
be not experienced as such.  The commonly cited claim, 
usually stated as a logical impossibility is that one can no 
more experience his own death than he can jump over his 
own shadow.  I am arguing, however, that in terms of 
consciousness I do experience death, the death which is 
mine.  In the relevant sense, death is no more an event for the 
individual than is his life.  We say easily enough that one 
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experiences her own life, but notice that this is a peculiar 
expression.  Compare “I experience my own speech, I 
experience my own thinking.”  Does this mean anything 
more than acknowledging the necessary awareness that ‘I 
speak, I think?’  We might rather say that experience is life 
and life experience and acknowledge the tautology.   
 
   The fact that human reflection is a conceptual doubling of 
ourselves, however, means that we can not only do things, 
but can attend to and reflect on what we are doing, so it is as 
if we were split into two persons, one observing or critical of 
the other.  The parallel with life and death is not that anyone 
would say that experience is death or equate the two in this 
same way, but the question remains whether 
consciousness/experience/life must include death.  If life and 
death arrive in consciousness (or with consciousness) 
together, then death is in and with me as much and as long as 
life is in me.  To the extent I am my life—the limits and 
substance of my consciousness—I am also my death.  As 
temporal creatures consciousness is a factor of time, so that 
human beings are in life, in the world, and in consciousness 
all at the same time and in the same way.  And it is in the 
same way that in living we are dying: as we are in life, then 
we are also in death.  Consciousness comprehends both, 
whether Freud is right about these as primal instincts or not.  
That we are anxious about our own life is an 
acknowledgment that we are haunted by the certainty of our 
own death. 
 
   There is an odd disconnect between knowledge and belief 
that occurs in the question of my own death.  As death is the 
one thing about which we are certain (taxes however 
predictable can be avoided, while death holds dominion over 
individual life) there is that important and residual sense in 
which I cannot imagine it, as in the opening citation from 
Freud.  In this sense I know I’m going to die, but I don’t 
believe it.  Descartes and Russell are curious places to begin 
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this puzzle and the unraveling of paradox, but it is familiar 
ground.  ‘The cat is on the mat, but I don’t believe it’ is 
Russell’s paradigm of nonsense.  To be cognitively aware of 
the cat on the mat entails belief:  If I know the cat is on the 
mat, I  cannot not believe it.  But this is not the case with 
death.  ‘I know I am going to die (that I am dying), but I 
don’t believe it’ is curiously intelligible if in order to believe 
it, I must be able to imagine it. Is it that imagination balks at 
the prospect of its own demise?  Something more than this, I 
think.  Descartes’ Cogito illustrates the point in another way 
if we take it not as a deduction but as an equivalence in 
which the “ergo” is eliminated—Cogito, Sum: I think, I am.  
I cannot think my own death; in imagining the world without 
me, I am still imagining and here is the conundrum: it is an 
imagining necessarily of an existential fiction. The result is 
that I am quite certain that I am going to die, I simply cannot 
imagine it.  I can believe it as a result of my knowledge of 
the world and its ways, but I cannot believe it in the sense of 
an independent cognition of my non-existence. This is the 
sense in which I am my life as I am my world.  Even so, and 
this is the juncture of the uncanny: imagination carries with 
it the emptiness of what it is not—death. 
 
III 
 
   Heidegger puts it that Dasein is always a being toward 
death, but once again as with Freud, so understood death is 
not an experienced terminus, not an event.  The point rather 
describes the process of human-being as consciousness 
aware of its own contingency.  From the perspective of a life 
narrative, thinking of our lives as a space between natality 
and fatality parallel to the auto-bio-graphy—the self writing 
out of one’s own life--abstracts time into space and 
configures life on a progressive scale or graph: 
beginning/middle/end —birth/life/death.  We record births as 
events, of course, as we record deaths as events.  But as 
independent events they are not a part of the ongoing current 
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of consciousness that is my life.  It is only later, of course, 
that I reflect on my birth—that is achieve an acute awareness 
that I am, and this existential awareness brings with it the 
corresponding awareness that I might not have been, and 
indeed an acknowledgment that I will not be.  However 
much consciousness balks at this contraction, death itself is 
rooted in the genuine awareness of my own existence. 
 
   Heidegger persuasively argues that we are not only beings 
toward death but equally beings-in-death—that death is with 
us from the very arche of our individuated being.  As a mere 
happening or event, death is the routine if sorrowful 
acknowledgment by someone concerning some other person.  
It is only in realizing my death in the awareness of my life 
that makes my death finally absolute and completes the 
paradox of human existence. 
 
   Given this focus we must attend the detail of consciousness 
of death.  I can be interested in the life and death of others in 
much the same way as my own—of the preciousness and 
contingency of their existence only in so far as I share a 
consciousness with them.  The event of their death—that is, 
death considered as an event, a fact—is of interest to me in 
the sense that consciousness no longer shared—either of life 
or death. 
 
   Apart from the abstractions and speculations about our 
common lives and deaths, Love and Death remain the staples 
of consciousness and the ground of philosophical thought in 
the poetic creation of cultural life.  In one of Freud’s 
incidental essays, “The Uncanny”, he refers to the 
consciousness of death as a primitive and uncanny feeling 
and remarks that there has been no emotional change in the 
attitude toward death since earliest times.  Elsewhere he 
remarks that Silence, Solitude, Darkness are elements in the 
production of infantile morbid anxiety from which the 
majority of human beings have never become quite free.  
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Such is the human condition that only Man knows what it is 
to die, knows that he is going to die, and so only for man is 
there death in life.  Heidegger’s now familiar description of 
human-being as being-toward-death, in terms of individual 
human consciousness makes it equally true to say that 
human-being is being in death, being in time; consciousness 
is a being conscious of mortality.  Recall Nietzsche’s line 
concerning that moment in the quiet alone in the darkest 
night when all the usual business of life has fallen away:  we 
are left to wonder about our own existence and are met with 
only a deepening silence.  
 
IV 
 
   There is a grasshopper on the screen as I look out the 
window. It has been in the exact same spot since yesterday 
morning. It is clearly dead; it is just there. It came to its final 
moments there for whatever reason.  There was life in it, and 
it is no longer there.   And how is it different with my life?  
We make a great deal of our lives, and so make a paramount 
issue of death as well.  When all is said and done it is surely 
a matter only of human perspective and individual concern. 
As human beings we have a choice to be as indifferent about 
our death as we are of the absence of life in that grasshopper.  
Recall Hume’s remark that from the standpoint of reason—
that is, in the absence of sentiment—I no more care about the 
life and death of something or someone than the scratching 
of my little finger.  The problem is that such an indifference 
to death seems to require a similar attitude toward life, which 
constitutes a pathological perversion of human-being itself.  
Heidegger’s familiar description of human-being centers in 
‘care’ or ‘concern’ for the same reason, and Rilke’s poetic 
expression in Duino Elegies echoes the same point: 
 
Why, then have to be human? 
Because everything here/ Vanishing so quickly, 
seems to need us… 
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To have been here once/ To have been at one with the 
earth— 
This is beyond undoing. 
 
   We noted at the outset that the occasion of the asking about 
the question of death—young or old, well or ill, in the joyful 
embrace of strength, or weary of life’s demands—will make 
a difference in what one can hope to learn from the question.   
We should note also that a sense for the poetics of the 
question also makes a difference.  Robert Frost’s poetry as in 
the following from “Acquainted with the Night” has often a 
contextual sense of the depth of such questions: 
 
I have walked out in rain/ outwalked the furthest city 
light 
Stood still and stopped the sound of feet / When far 
away an interrupted cry  
Came …not to call me back or say good-bye/  And 
further still at an unearthly height / A luminary clock 
against the sky/ Proclaimed the time was neither 
wrong nor right/ …I have been one acquainted with 
the night. 
 
   While natality/mortality is the discursive dyad of human 
existence, it is less a question of fact than of value whether 
there need be an existential melancholy connected with this 
linkage—whether as human beings we necessarily suffer 
from an elemental death anxiety as Freud describes and as 
Ernest Becker, for example,  has elaborated it in The Denial 
of Death.  This idea taken as fact—that the reality (physical 
or psychical?) of our condition is dismal—has the effect that 
philosophers, poets, pundits, priests, and publicists have all 
joined in the view that human beings require the distractions 
of culture against the pressing and ubiquitous inevitability of 
death.  This anxiety in turn leads to an analysis of social 
order and cultural perspective as providing an illusion of 
meaning in an otherwise chaotic (human) universe.  But 
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chaos in this general and not technical sense is in fact a 
derivative notion; it emerges only on the insistence that the 
universe be compliable to human regulatory needs.  From the 
standpoint of physics of course, chaos itself becomes 
incorporated in the larger scheme of regulatory description.  
In the real world beyond the compensatory needs and 
logistical schemes of human beings, however, there is only 
continuous motion: hunger and satiety, exhaustion and 
recovery: needs generated and satisfied (or not) occur at 
every organic level.  So it is not a fact but a perception that 
induces and accompanies the pensive moments in human 
consciousness when it focuses on death as an offense, an 
obstacle, a sentence, an affront to consciousness. However 
primal the anxiety, it is, for all that, optional not necessary in 
our comportment toward the human condition. 
 
   The cultural activities of human kind may and have been 
interpreted and analyzed as elaborately constructed 
diversions from the primal anxieties of death and its 
associated metaphors of silence, solitude and darkness, but 
there is nothing finally compelling in this view.  We have 
still to determine how much weight to give to the idea that 
“only man dies”, how much value to attach to an acute 
awareness of the inevitable contingencies of existence. There 
is both romance and depth to this awareness, but melancholy 
and madness as well.  Marlowe’s remark in Heart of 
Darkness that ‘We live as we dream, alone.’ carries in 
context an intimation of a lament to mean: we live as we 
dream, and as we die—alone.  But of course this is not really 
true: we do not live or dream alone unless we pathologically 
lose a sense of distinction between waking and dreaming; 
even dreams are populated with the intrusive residuals of 
others—we are no more alone there than in our waking 
moments of consciousness.  The configured isolation of 
death is an existential construct of solipsism which has a 
certain appeal to the dark side of our sensibilities, but it is a 
construction no less, and hence optional.  Must we, however, 
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die alone?  Is death that final distancing which separates us 
into individuated creatures? It is tempting to think that death 
is in this way singular and definitive of the human condition, 
but this too is misleading.  Many persons do not die alone:  
In response to the battlefield cry ‘Once more into the breach 
dear friends…’ the valiant  go to face their death together.  
Suicide pacts are attempts to avoid just this isolation—it is 
impossible to forget images of people joining hands and 
leaping to their death from the flaming ledges of the 
crumbling twin towers during the horror of September 11th.  
People die at home in beds, or in hospitals surrounded by 
family and friends.  And, of course, some indeed do die 
alone, isolated, lonely, and miserable.  On the psychic no 
less than practical level, death is a matter of perspective and 
perception, and the resolution of the puzzle of existence is a 
matter of comportment, not simply concession. 
 
   Existential angst may but need not accompany the 
realization that the human condition is being toward death.  
The sometimes weary resignation this realization may bring 
is recalled in Addie Bundren’s acceptance of the truth of her 
father’s counsel in Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying that living is 
just getting ready to stay dead a long time.  Implied in  
Addie’s resignation is also the common assent that there are 
worse things than dying.  That this is so and a common 
belief—for example in the case of constant and irremediable 
pain, or loss of sentience, or even deep humiliation—living 
may become such that death is no longer a matter of dread, 
but a consoling consummation devoutly to be wished.  Or 
not:  once again the voice of the poetic embraces a range of 
options to this comportment. At the cusp of death, there are 
resources still; recall Yeats’ familiar lines that an old man is 
but a paltry thing, a tattered coat upon a stick—unless  soul 
clap its hands and sing.  Dylan Thomas’ counsel as if to his 
father but speaking for himself and to all of us that wise men, 
good men, wild men, grave men—none go gentle into that 
good night, but rage, rage against the dying of the light.  As 
  
 
13  
Tennyson reminds us, the woods decay and fall, the vapors 
weep their burden to the ground, Man comes to till the earth 
and lie beneath, and after many a summer dies the swan. 
Whether on the occasion of death the individual rages or 
sings there is beauty in the realization of the fullness of his 
existence. 
 
   There are, then, no facts that decide the issue of human 
anxiety, whether of death or any other.  If death anxiety is 
primal, it none-the-less can be displaced by a simple 
resolution to cease upon the midnight with no pain, no less 
than an elaborately conceived scheme of human immortality 
to counter despair.  Having said all this, it is no more true of 
ordinary language and sensibility than it is of theological 
constructions that any of this does away with the riddle of 
existence and the inevitability of death.  Whatever we say, 
whatever we discover in or about ourselves as human beings, 
the mystery remains.  Death is a phenomenon that focuses 
consciousness on the paradox of human existence, and 
whatever results from subsequent inquiry seldom gets 
beyond an acute recognition of this mystery.  Wittgenstein 
remarked that it is not how the world is, but that it is, that is 
the mystery.  The same can be said about life, of course, and 
about death.  There is no small revelation in this recognition 
that at the heart of the human condition we discover not 
simply a primal anxiety concerning death, but a mystery that 
quickens the imagination and deepens the soul.  Acceptance 
of this elemental mystery and a poetic reconciliation with the 
paradox suggest that the secret of any genuine resolution to 
the question of death will be found less in the distractions of 
abstract immortality, than in simple acts of mortal 
fulfillment. 
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